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Defendants and appellees Senator John William Hickman and Representative 
Stephen H. Urquhart ("legislative defendants") submit this appellees* brief. 
COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case under Article VIII, Section 
5 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issues: 
1. Did the district court properly dismiss plaintiffs complaint because the 
legislative defendants are absolutely immune from suit under the principle 
of legislative immunity as expressed in the Speech or Debate Clause of 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 8? 
2. Could the district court have likewise properly dismissed plaintiffs 
complaint on the ground that the legislative defendants are not plaintiffs 
employer under the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act ("UPPEA"), 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9, and that plaintiff, therefore, has no claim 
under UPPEA against the legislative defendants? 
Standard of appellate review: Whether a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted was properly granted is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 
1004 (Utah 1994). 
Citation to the record where the issue was preserved: The issues were the subject 
of the legislative defendants' motion to dismiss, Record (hereafter MR.,f) at 83-85, and 
supporting memorandum, R. at 52-57 and 60-61, plaintiffs memorandum opposing the 
motion to dismiss, R. at 90-95 and 98-100, and the legislative defendants' reply 
memorandum supporting their motion to dismiss, R. at 105-110. 
PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Constitution 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 8: 
. . . for words used in any speech or debate in either house, [Members of the 
Legislature] shall not be questioned in any other place. 
Statute 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2(4): 
(4)(a) "Employer" means the employing state agency or political 
subdivision of the state. 
(b) "Employer" includes an agent of an employer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
This is an action under the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act ("UPPEA"), 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9, for damages resulting from the termination of 
plaintiffs employment with the Utah Department of Health. 
2 
Course of proceedings 
After plaintiff filed a verified complaint, R. at 1-15, the legislative defendants filed 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. R. at 
83-85. The district court ruled on the legislative defendants' motion in a minute entry 
dated September 23, 2003, R. at 114-120, and then entered an order on October 15, 2003, 
dismissing plaintiffs complaint. R. at 121-122. 
Plaintiff also named the State of Utah and the Utah Department of Health as 
defendants. Plaintiffs complaint against those parties was dismissed by an order dated 
December 15, 2003, R. at 136-137, pursuant to stipulation. R. at 131-132. Those 
defendants are not involved in the present appeal. 
Disposition in the court below 
The district court entered an order on October 15, 2003, dismissing plaintiffs 
complaint against the legislative defendants. R. at 121-122. 
Statement of facts 
An appellate court is required to accept as true all material allegations contained in 
the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations.1 Based on that 
standard, the facts of this case are as follows: 
1. Plaintiff was an employee of the Utah Department of Health in the Division of 
Epidemiology and Laboratory Services and the Bureau of Food Safety and Environmental 
lWest, 872 ?2d at 1004. 
3 
Health from approximately 1990 to July 2003. Compl. % 2, 6, 7, and 18 (R. at 2, 3, and 
6). 
2. During 1991, plaintiff was assigned by his supervisor to conduct training with 
local health department staff in the St. George and Cedar City areas and to assess the 
public pool sanitation and safety program in those areas. Compl. fflf 8 (R. at 3). 
3. Plaintiff determined that the local health department was not enforcing 
applicable state rules. He reported his findings to his supervisor. Complaint %s 9 and 10 
(R. at 3-4). 
4. Senator Hickman and Representative Urquhart are duly elected legislators 
serving in the Utah Legislature. Senator Hickman represents Senate District 29 which, at 
the time of the events referred to in plaintiffs complaint, covered Iron County and part of 
Washington County. Representative Urquhart represents House district 75 which covers 
part of Washington County. R. at 49.2 
5. After plaintiff reported his findings to his supervisor, a constituent of Senator 
Hickman and Representative Urquhart complained to them and argued that her swimming 
pool should be exempt from state rules regulating public swimming pools. Senator 
Hickman and Representative Urquhart contacted plaintiffs supervisors. They also asked 
plaintiff to exempt pools operated by retirement communities from portions of the state 
2The district court took judicial notice of these facts pursuant to the legislative 
defendants' request R. at 115. 
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rules and told plaintiff that if he did not comply, they would deal with the issue through 
legislative action. CompL 1fl[ 11 and 12 (R. at 4). 
6. On March 1, 2002, during the 2002 General Session of the Utah Legislature, 
the Executive Appropriations Committee of the Utah Legislature met. Senator Hickman 
was a member of that committee; Representative Urquhart was not. During the meeting, 
Senator Poulton made a motion to reduce the General Fund for the Department of Health, 
Epidemiology and Laboratory Services, Bureau of Food Safety and Environmental 
Health, by $115,700, reflecting the elimination of two full-time positions, and to increase 
funding by that same amount in favor of Medicaid breast and cervical cancer treatment. 
The motion passed, with all but one of the 18 members present voting in favor. R. at 50-
51.3 See also Complaint^ 13 (R. at 4). 
7. The reduction in funding to the Department of Health, recommended by the 
Executive Appropriations Committee, was reflected in Senate Bill 1, Appropriations Act, 
sponsored by Senator Leonard Blackham. S.B. 1, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004). 
S.B. 1 passed both houses of the Legislature on March 5,2002. The vote in the House 
was 45 in favor, 27 opposed, and 3 absent. The vote in the Senate was 21 in favor, 4 
opposed, and 4 absent Governor Leavitt signed S.B. 1 into law on March 26,2002. R. at 
51.4 
3See footnote 2, supra. 
4See footnote 2, supra. 
5 
8. In response to the Department of Health's budget reduction, plaintiffs job was 
terminated. According to the facts alleged in plaintiffs complaint, the executive director 
of the Department of Health was motivated to single out plaintiff for job termination due 
to Senator Hickman's threat to push for future cuts in appropriations to the Department of 
Health if the executive director did not comply. Compl f^ 15 (R. at 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In his complaint, plaintiff claims that actions of the legislative defendants led to 
the termination of his job with the Utah Department of Health in violation of UPPEA. 
The district court correctly concluded that those actions "were within the Legislative 
Defendants power as legislators," Minute Entry, *§ 30 (R. at 118), and that the legislative 
defendants "are absolutely immune from the acts alleged by Plaintiff." Id. That ruling is 
correct and should be affirmed. The actions that plaintiff claims led to the termination of 
his job were within the legitimate legislative sphere, making the legislative defendants 
absolutely immune from liability under the principle of legislative immunity, as embodied 
in the Speech or Debate Clause of Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution. Any of 
their actions that may fall outside the legitimate legislative sphere did not cause the 
termination of plaintiff s job and are not actionable. Furthermore, the district court order 
of dismissal should be affirmed because the legislative defendants are not plaintiffs 
employer, as defined in UPPEA, and plaintiff has no claim against the legislative 
defendants under that act. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BASED 
ON LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
The district court correctly ruled that the legislative defendants are protected from 
liability for the claims asserted by plaintiff because of legislative immunity as reflected in 
Utah's Speech or Debate Clause. Utah Const, art. VI, § 8. The district court's dismissal 
of plaintiff s complaint is correct and should be affirmed. 
1. Legislative immunity protects the legislative defendants from liability 
arising from actions within the legitimate legislative sphere. 
Article VI, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution provides that "for words used in any 
speech or debate in either house, [members of the Legislature] shall not be questioned in 
any other place." This provision is almost identical to the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Constitution of the United States found in Article I, Section 6 which provides that"... for 
any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be 
questioned in any other Place." 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed these two provisions in Riddle v. Perry. 2002 
UT 10 (Utah 2002). In Riddle, plaintiff brought an action against a witness at a 
legislative hearing for allegedly defamatory statements the witness made at the hearing. 
In concluding that legislative immunity under Utah's Speech or Debate Clause shields the 
witness from liability, the court cited and quoted approvingly cases decided by the United 
7 
States Supreme Court under the federal Speech or Debate Clause. Although Riddle is not 
directly on point,5 it indicates that cases decided by the United States Supreme Court are 
persuasive authority in interpreting the substantially similar Utah Speech or Debate 
Clause.6 The legislative immunity cases decided under the federal Speech or Debate 
Clause support the district court's dismissal in this case based on legislative immunity 
under Utah's Speech or Debate Clause. 
In interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution of the United 
States, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that the Clause provides civil and 
criminal immunity to legislative branch members engaged in activities within the 
legitimate legislative sphere.7 Legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause is 
5Although not on point—and there are no Utah cases that are--Riddle supports 
Speech or Debate Clause immunity for the legislative defendants in this case. If the 
Speech or Debate Clause is broad enough to protect a witness at a legislative hearing, it is 
broad enough to protect legislators performing a function at the core of their legislative 
authority. 
6See also Terra Utilities, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 575 P.2d 1029,1033 (Utah 
1978) ("Since the due process clause of our state Constitution (Article I, Section 7) is 
substantially similar to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the federal due process clauses 
are highly persuasive as to the application of that clause of our state Constitution."). 
7Cases from state courts have followed the reasoning and holdings of United States 
Supreme Court decisions in interpreting their states' similar Speech or Debate Clauses. 
See, e.g., Whalen v. Hartley, 63 P.3d 254,258 (Alaska 2003) (affirming dismissal of 
action by a state employee against legislators who attached defamatory information to 
committee minutes, stating that Alaska's legislative immunity provision is "patterned after 
the federal speech or debate clause," and relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the scope of federal immunity); Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate, 872 
S.W.2d 433, 440 (Ky. 1993) (holding that Kentucky's Speech or Debate Clause extends 
8 
an important safeguard of legislative independence within the framework of a separation 
of powers. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975) 
(The Clause serves the function "'of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately 
established by the Founders.1") (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 178 (1966).8 
Legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause ensures that "the legislative 
function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently," id., 
leaving legislators "free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that 
they will be later called to task in the courts for that representation." Powell v. 
McCormack 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969). The protections of the Speech or Debate Clause 
are secured "not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions for 
their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives 
to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal." 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-374 (1951) (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 
immunity to Senate members voting on executive apppointments, and stating that the 
Clause applies to "every official act in the execution of legislative duties while in 
session"); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 
1984) (holding Kansas Legislature immune under Kansas Speech or Debate Clause from 
an action challenging the constitutionality of a statute); Wiggins v. Stuart, 671 S.W.2d 
262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming, on the basis of Kentucky's Speech or Debate Clause, 
dismissal of declaratory judgment action against members of Kentucky General Assembly 
challenging legislation upon which they acted); and Consumers Educ. and Protective 
Ass'n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1977) (holding that the complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against senator and president of the senate regarding confirmation vote of 
appointee following alleged violation of Pennsylvania's "Sunshine Law" should have 
been dismissed due to immunity provided by Pennsylvania's Speech or Debate Clause). 
8In Utah, the separation of powers concept is explicitly expressed in Article V, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
9 
27 (1808)). See also Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Ky. 2001) (stating that the 
protections of the Speech or Debate Clause are secured "not to protect those individuals 
from liability for their own unjustifiable conduct but to protect their offices against the 
deterrent effect of a threat of suit alleging improper motives where there has been no 
more than a . . . disagreement on the part of the complaining party with the decision 
made."). 
To achieve the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court has read the 
Clause broadly. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, All U.S. at 501 
("Without exception, our cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly to 
effectuate its purposes."). Although the clause speaks in terms of "speech or debate," the 
Court's 
consistent approach has been that to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate 
Clause to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view. 
Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered; f[i]n 
short,. . . things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in 
relation to the business before it.' Rather than giving the clause a cramped 
construction, the Court has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of freeing 
the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to 
control his conduct as a legislator. 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617-618 (1972) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)). 
The Clause protects against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions 
brought by private individuals as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch. 
Eastland, All U.S. at 503 ("The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions is 
10 
supported by the absoluteness of the terms 'shall not be questioned,' and the sweep of the 
term 'in any other Place.'"). It protects not only from liability but also from the burden of 
defending a lawsuit, since even "a private civil action, whether for an injunction or 
damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and 
attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation." Id. at 503 (Whether a 
criminal action is instituted by the executive branch or a civil action brought by private 
parties, "judicial power is still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative 
independence is imperiled."). 
The critical inquiry in any Speech or Debate Clause case is whether the activities 
complained of are within "the legitimate legislative sphere." Eastland, All U.S. at 503 
("We reaffirm that once it is determined that Members are acting within the 'legitimate 
legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference.") Thus, 
for example, in Doe v. McMillan, All U.S. 306 (1973), the Court applied Speech or 
Debate Clause immunity to bar an invasion of privacy action against members of a 
Congressional committee who had authorized an investigation pursuant to which 
allegedly objectionable materials violating plaintiffs' rights were gathered, introduced at 
committee hearings, and reproduced in a report that was then published and distributed 
upon the committee's authorization. The Court found those actions to be "legislative acts" 
immune from suit. Id. at 312. The Court stated that members of Congress would be 
immune from liability for actions within the legislative sphere "even though their 
conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be 
unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes." Id. at 312-313.9 
A fundamental aspect of legislative immunity is that courts may not inquire into 
the motives of legislators. In Tenney, 341 U.S. 367, 377, the plaintiff claimed that a 
legislative hearing was not held for a legislative purpose but was designed to intimidate 
and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising certain 
constitutional rights, including the right of free speech and the right to petition the 
Legislature for redress of grievances. In upholding legislative immunity in that case, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are 
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not 
for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect 
uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if 
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial 
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them 
based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. The holding of this Court in 
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,130, 3 L.Ed. 162, that it was not consonant with our 
scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has 
remained unquestioned.... 
In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed 
to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such 
9See also Eastland, 421 U.S. 491 (stating that an action to enjoin implementation 
of a subpoena issued by a Senate subcommittee must be dismissed since actions of 
subcommittee members fell within the legitimate sphere and were protected by the 
Speech or Debate Clause); Kilbourn, 103 U.S. 168 (affirming dismissal of action for false 
imprisonment against members of a House committee who exceeded their authority by 
requiring the plaintiff to testify involuntarily and against the speaker of the House for 
issuing an arrest warrant upon plaintiffs refusal to testify). 
12 
controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for 
discouraging or correcting such abuses. 
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-378. 
The principle that courts may not examine legislative motives is reiterated in 
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998). In Bogan, the Supreme Court extended 
legislative immunity to local legislators who introduced, voted for, and signed an 
ordinance eliminating the government office held by the plaintiff who claimed that the 
termination was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for 
exercising her First Amendment rights. Echoing Tenney, the Court stated: 
Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the 
motive or intent of the official performing it. The privilege of absolute immunity 
"would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and 
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the 
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives." 
Furthermore, it simply is "not consonant with our scheme of government for a 
court to inquire into the motives of legislators." . . . 
This leave us with the question whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and 
motive, petitioners1 actions were legislative. We have little trouble concluding that 
they were 
. . . The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating 
the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city provides to its 
constituents. Moreover, it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the 
hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that 
reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. 
Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55 (internal citations omitted).10 
10Similar to Tenney and Bogan, this case involves a claim that the legislative 
defendants, in seeking a reduction in the appropriation to the Department of Health, were 
13 
The foregoing principles of legislative immunity under the federal Speech or 
Debate Clause apply with equal force to legislative immunity under Utah's Speech or 
Debate Clause. To the extent that the legislative defendants1 actions that gave rise to 
plaintiffs alleged damages are within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, the 
legislative defendants are immune from suit. Moreover, under Tenney and Bogan, a court 
may not inquire into the motives of the legislative defendants for actions within the 
legitimate legislative sphere. 
2. The legislative defendants' actions are within the legitimate legislative 
sphere, making the legislative defendants immune from suit. To the extent 
that the legislative defendants' actions are outside the legitimate legislative 
sphere, they are not actionable. 
Under the principles established in the cases discussed above, the critical question 
in a case where legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause is asserted as a 
defense is whether the activities complained of are within the legitimate legislative 
sphere. If so, motives are irrelevant, and the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar 
to suit. 
improperly motivated by the legislative defendants' alleged desire to terminate plaintiffs 
employment. Under Tenney and Bogan, even if plaintiff s allegations are true the 
legislative defendants' motives are irrelevant. What matters is whether their actions are 
within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. If so, then immunity applies. The 
actions of considering appropriations for the various fiscal needs of the state and 
adjusting those appropriations as the Legislature considers appropriate-as well as 
considering future adjustments in appropriations-are core legislative activities. The 
motives of legislators in making those determinations relating to appropriations are not a 
legitimate area of judicial inquiry. The legislative defendants are shielded from 
immunity for any claim arising from those activities. 
14 
In this case, plaintiff claims that the legislative defendants engineered a reduction 
in the appropriation to the Department of Health so that plaintiffs job would be 
terminated. The actions of the legislative defendants were part of the process the 
Legislature goes through each year to appropriate public funds. Stripped of all 
considerations of intent or motive, the actions of the legislative defendants are squarely 
legislative. Because the activities of the legislative defendants are within the legitimate 
legislative sphere, whether their actions were an attempt to target plaintiffs position for 
elimination is irrelevant. The legislative defendants are immune from suit under the 
Speech or Debate Clause, and the district court order dismissing this action should be 
affirmed. 
Plaintiff concedes that legislative immunity protects the legislative defendants 
from liability for their actions within the legitimate legislative sphere.11 Plaintiff argues, 
however, that some of the legislative defendants* actions were not within the legitimate 
legislative sphere. He claims that the legislative defendants tried to interfere with 
plaintiff s job performance and attempted to persuade plaintiffs boss to terminate his 
employment.12 As the district court correctly pointed out, "even if the Legislative 
nAppellant's Opening Brief ] at 13. 
12Under plaintiffs argument, a disgruntled swimming pool owner, for example, 
who disagreed with the testing criteria used by plaintiff and complained to plaintiffs 
supervisor, insisting that plaintiff be dismissed for overzealousness, would be subject to 
liability for those actions if the supervisor actually decided that plaintiff should be 
dismissed. The one responsible for the dismissal is not the disgruntled swimming pool 
owner but the supervisor who made the independent determination to dismiss an 
15 
Defendants' threats were outside of the broad umbrella of protection [afforded by 
legislative immunity], any threats made by the Legislative Defendants were more or less 
true statements of their power as legislators. Plaintiff has failed to provide a legal basis 
for how these threats are actionable." Minute Entry, % 30, n. 2 (R. at 118). That 
conclusion of the district court is correct and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS 
ARE NOT PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER UNDER UPPEA, 
AND PLAINTIFF HAS NO CLAIM UNDER THAT ACT13 
The Utah Protection of Public Employees Act (UPPEA), Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-
1 to -9, establishes a cause of action in favor of an employee whose employer takes 
certain adverse action against the employee for engaging in certain "whistleblowing" 
activities identified in § 67-21-3. The legislative defendants are not plaintiffs employer 
employee. Similarly, in this case the legislative defendants did not maintain an employer-
employee relationship with plaintiff. Plaintiff was an employee of the Department of 
Health. The legislative defendants had no authority to exert direct influence on the 
performance of plaintiff s job or to determine whether plaintiffs employment would or 
would not continue. Even if they had tried to convince plaintiffs boss to terminate his 
employment, his boss could have disregarded that input and exercised the prerogatives of 
his position to decline to terminate plaintiffs employment. The decision to terminate 
belonged exclusively to plaintiffs supervisor, notwithstanding any alleged effort on the 
part of the legislative defendants to influence that decision. 
13The legislative defendants made this argument before the district court, but that 
court based its dismissal only on legislative immunity and did not address the legislative 
defendants' argument under UPPEA. Minute Entry, % 23 (R. at 117). This court may 
nevertheless affirm the district court's order based on that argument. Bailey v. Bayles, 
2002 UT 58 (Utah 2002). 
16 
and are not subject to liability for any alleged violation of the UPPEA. Plaintiffs 
complaint alleging a violation of the UPPEA by the legislative defendants has no merit, 
and the district court's dismissal of the complaint should be affirmed. 
An "employer" under the UPPEA is defined as "the employing state agency or 
political subdivision of the state." Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2(4)(a). "Employer" includes 
"an agent of an employer." Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2(4)(b). As he states in his 
complaint, plaintiff was at all times relevant to this action "employed with the Department 
of Health." Complaint, % 6 (R. at 2). Plaintiff claims, however, that Senator Hickman 
and Representative Urquhart are also his employer because they are "agents of the 
employer." Complaint, f 3 (R. at 2). 
For the court to determine that Senator Hickman and Representative Urquhart are 
agents of the Department of Health, the plaintiff must show that they were acting on 
behalf and subject to the control of the Department of Health. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
Natl Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) ("A court can find that an agency 
relationship exists only if the agent is shown to have been acting on behalf and subject to 
the control of the principal."). It would be a monumental contortion of agency law to 
conclude that Senator Hickman and Representative Urquhart, members of the legislative 
branch, were acting on behalf and subject to the control of the Department of Health, an 
executive branch department, when they took action to influence the Legislature to reduce 
17 
the Department of Health's budget.14 Indeed, plaintiff alleges just the opposite, that the 
executive director of the Department of Health was acting under pressure from Senator 
Hickman when he terminated plaintiffs employment. Comply \ 15 (R. at 5). 
The legislative defendants are not agents of the Department of Health. They did 
not become his employer simply by, as plaintiff alleges, attempting to influence plaintiffs 
supervisor to terminate plaintiffs position. Plaintiffs complaint alleging a claim under 
the UPPEA against the legislative defendants fails to state a claim against the legislative 
defendants under UPPEA, and the district court's dismissal of the complaint was proper 
and should be affirmed. 
I4The legislative defendants are constitutionally prohibited from acting as an agent 
of the Department of Health under Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution which 
states that "no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to [the 
Legislative, Executive, or Judicial Departments of government] shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others " 
18 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellees hcuju, 
Representative Stephen t l Uiqulmi i ^ • *• * *\e tuun io affirm the 1c 
cutifi't) tmit'i dismissniy pi.lintiffs complaint 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of August, 2004. 
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